Details
- Baghdad witnessed one of its most significant political arrest campaigns in years early Sunday, after Iraqi forces raided targets inside the Green Zone and detained politicians, lawmakers and government officials.
- The arrests reportedly included seven people, among them five members of parliament, after parliamentary immunity was lifted for some of those targeted.
- Some wanted figures reportedly escaped before security forces arrived, prompting authorities to close Green Zone entrances and expand search operations. More arrests could follow in the coming days.
- Iraq’s Karkh Second Investigative Court is reviewing accusations linked to around 17 people, including lawmakers, officials and political figures.
- The names circulating include Muthana al-Samarrai, Alia Nassif, Mohammed al-Karbouli, Mohammed al-Sayhud, Wasit Governor Mohammed al-Mayahi, Bahaa al-Nouri, Mudar al-Karwi, Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie, Hassan al-Khafaji, Ali Maarij al-Bahadli, Hussein Muanis, Hind al-Abbasi, Alaa Sukkar al-Dulaimi and Ziyad al-Janabi.
- Hasan’s reading pushes back against claims that the raids amount to a “coup.” He argues that such a description exaggerates both the scale of the operation and the political weight of those targeted.
- Most of the names, according to Hasan, sit in Iraq’s second or third political tier. Even al-Samarrai, the most prominent figure among those mentioned, is not indispensable to the ruling equation.
- Hasan also casts doubt on the Iran angle. Most of the names being discussed are Sunni politicians, officials or state functionaries. The Shiite figures involved are not viewed as core pro-Iran actors or figures closely tied to the IRGC.
- That makes the “Iran targeting its rivals” frame weaker than a more familiar Iraqi story: competition over power, leverage and state resources.
- Although some reports have linked the raids directly to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, Hasan notes that arrest warrants against figures of this stature are unlikely to be issued without approval from senior levels of Iraq’s judiciary.
- In that sense, Zaidi may be overseeing the campaign, or benefiting politically from it, rather than being its sole architect.
- The broader backdrop began weeks ago with the detention of Adnan al-Jumaili, the deputy oil minister for refining affairs, in one of the highest-profile corruption cases since Zaidi took office.
- Politically, some of those targeted are linked to the bloc of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, whose list won the largest number of seats in November’s elections before he was pushed out of the premiership by deadlock inside the Coordination Framework.
- That makes Sudani, in Hasan’s reading, the most visible loser so far. But it is still too early to draw firm conclusions.
- The campaign comes at a sensitive moment for Zaidi’s government, which was formed in May after parliament approved a partial cabinet. His administration is already facing pressure over corruption, the economy, relations with Washington and Tehran, and the role of armed factions.
- Zaidi is also expected to visit Washington in July to strengthen economic and trade ties with the United States, while trying to present himself as a leader capable of restoring state authority and attracting investment.
- The campaign may therefore serve a dual purpose: judicial in form, political in effect. It gives the new government a chance to project seriousness at home and abroad, while also reshuffling power balances inside Iraq’s political class.
- Iraq’s recent history warrants caution. New governments often begin with anti-corruption drives, only for those campaigns to lose momentum or become bargaining chips among rival factions.
- What may make this episode different, Hasan argues, is the apparent backing from senior layers of the judiciary and the broader context of mounting economic and external pressure.
What’s next?
The key questions now are whether the judiciary will publish clear charges, whether investigations will reach first-tier political figures, and whether the process will remain a legal track or turn into a negotiable political message.
If the campaign expands beyond mid-level names and reaches major financial and contracting networks, it could give Zaidi early legitimacy and redraw the limits of impunity in Iraq.
If it stops at a limited wave of arrests, it will likely be remembered as another round of elite competition rather than a turning point in the fight against corruption.